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1- INTRODUCTION 1 
In the late 60s, Gary Becker (1968) "invaded" for the first time with a formal economic 
model an area that, until then, had been exclusively dominated by sociologists and psychologists, 
namely, criminal behavior.2 Since then, several models have been proposed by economists to 
explain, within frameworks of utility maximization, that type of behavior. This literature has, 
in my view, two problems which this paper seeks to overcome. 
The first problem with the literature on crime and punishment is that the cooperative 
framework used to analyze the problem does not seem to be the appropriate one. In most 
studies, the cooperative nature of the analytical framework follows from the fact that the welfare 
function to be maximized by (the decent members of) society takes into account the welfare of 
criminals. That is not, however, the way punishments are decided in the real world; for the 
decent members of society do not consider the criminals' welfare when deciding the punishments 
to be imposed. However, although the welfare of criminals does not play a role in the social 
decision about punishment, the behavior of criminals does. In that sense, this paper makes the 
contribution of introducing a noncooperative analytical framework that recreates such an 
interaction. 
In his Nobel prize lecture, Gary Becker (1993) suggested that, when he originally thought 
about the issue of crime and punishment, he did it in the way suggested above. He wrote: 
"I was late and had to decide quickly whether to put the car in a parking lot or 
risk getting a ticket for parking illegally on the street. I calculated the likelihood 
of getting a ticket, the size of the penalty, and the cost of putting the car in a lot. 
I decided it paid to take the risk and park the car on the street ... As I walked ... 
1 The first version of this paper was written over three years ago. Although the presentation 
has changed substantially over time, the analytical framework and main results are virtually 
identical to those of the original version. For helpful comments I would like to thank Tom Ulen, 
participants of the Graduate Student Workshop at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, and graduate students of the Institute Torcuato Di Tella (Buenos Aires, Argentina). 
The views expressed below and any errors that may remain are entirely my own. 
2 Bentham (1931) had informally anticipated many of the results formally derived by Becker 
(1968). 
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it occurred to me that the city authorities had probably gone through a similar 
analysis. The frequency of their inspection of parked vehicles and the size of the 
penalty imposed on violators should depend on their estimates of the type of 
calculations potential violators like me would make. 113 
It is precisely in this noncooperative way that I model in this paper the interaction 
between criminals and the rest of society. In order to do so, I bring the Stackelberg model of 
oligopoly into the discussion of criminal behavior. My approach is as follows: Criminals behave 
as Stackelberg followers that, given the probability of apprehension and the severity of the 
punishment, attempt to maximize their expected utility by choosing an optimal allocation of labor 
(crime) and leisure. The decent members of society, on the other hand, behave as Stackelberg 
leaders that, knowing that criminals behave as just explained, take into account that behavior, 
and attempt to maximize their utility by choosing an optimal allocation of resources between the 
production of commodities and the production of security, and the optimal severity of 
punishments. 
A second problem with the literature on crime and punishment is that most of its models 
are either too simple, almost informal (for example, Cooter and Dlen, 1988, chapters 11 and 
12), or so technical (Polinsky and Shavell, 1992) that their important policy recommendations 
do not reach the mathematically-unsophisticated reader. In that sense, this paper makes the 
contribution of introducing a simple, although rigorous, model of crime and punishment from 
which important policy recommendations can be derived. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In part Il, I introduc~ the model that 
criminals and the rest of society use to make their decisions, and address the issue of deterrence. 
In part Ill, I address the issue of optimal punishment and derive four propositions, each one 
being a policy recommendation. And, finally, in part IV, I summarize the most important results 
of the paper. 
11- THE MODEL 
Consider a society divided into two types of individuals: criminals and victims; a victim 
should be thought of as anyone who is not a criminal (hence, the decent members of society are 
3 Becker (1993), pp. 389-390. 
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victims). Both criminals and victims make their decisions in isolation, thus being prevented from 
bargaining; this (certainly realistic) assumption recreates the framework of a noncooperative 
game. As argued above, this noncooperative analytical framework is a departure from the 
previous literature. 
It is assumed that criminals and victims are rational and that, except in the extreme cases 
to be considered below, they do not use a utility maximization model to decide whether they will 
become criminals or victims. Rather, it is assumed that they both have moral constraints that 
force them to be either criminals or victims. To illustrate, an honest person would not steal an 
old lady's purse in a dark and lonely street just because he can easily reap a benefit and get 
away with his crime. This assumption of moral constraints seems to be reasonable for most 
members of society. 
1- The criminal's bebavior 
Consider a Beckerian framework in which the (representative) criminal produces himself 
the commodities he consumes.4 The criminal's utility depends upon two mutually-exclusive 
states of the world: in one the criminal gets away with his crime; in the other, he is caught and 
punished. Let ex be the probability of apprehension, which is taken as given by the criminal. The 
criminal's utility in the state of the world in which he is not punished depends on his 
consumption of a good (g), on his wealth (W), and on some other exogenous variables (Y). The 
criminal produces the good by combining two inputs, crime (c) and leisure time (1). Crime is 
(the monetary equivalent of) a harm that the criminal inflicts on his victims (the decent members 
of society), which he needs as an input in the production of the good he consumes. 
In order to produce crime, the criminal needs to allocate some time (t) to this activity; 
this time may be thought of as the criminal's labor time. Thus, the production function of crime 
is given by c=c(t), such that Ct>O. The good, a commodity whose consumption the criminal 
enjoys, is produced by combining two inputs, crime and leisure time. Thus, the production 
4 Becker's model of consumer behavior assumes that an individual does not derive utility 
directly from the goods he purchases. Rather, his utility depends on commodities he produces 
himself by combining the goods he purchases with his own time. Thus, the consumer-producer 
has to determine the optimal allocation of inputs (goods and time) such that the production of 
these home-made commodities maximizes his utility. See Becker (1971). 
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function of the good is given by g=g[c(t),n, such that gc>O and g\>O. Note that gc is the rate 
at which the criminal transforms the harm he inflicts on society into a good for himself. 
The criminal has to allocate his endowment of time (T) between the production of the 
good (leisure time) and the production of crime (labor time); hence, l+t=T. It thus follows 
from the set up of the model that the criminal's problem can be viewed as the standard choice 
between labor and leisure where, in this case, labor is the time the criminal allocates to criminal 
activities, and leisure is the time he allocates to produce the good he consumes. Further, let the 
criminal's utility depend on some other exogenous variables not explicitly considered in the 
model, represented by a vector Y, and on his (exogenously-determined) wealth (W). Thus, by 
putting together all the arguments considered above, the criminal's utility function when he is 
not punished (UN,) is given by UNP=U{g,W,Y} =U{g[c(t),1],W,Y} , such that U.>O, Uu<O, 
and Uw > O. The sign of Uy depends on which argument of this vector is being considered; some 
arguments generate utility and some others disutility. 
Consider now the criminal's utility function when he does not get away with his crime; 
that is, when he is caught and punished. The punishment (p) can take two forms, a fine (F) or 
(the monetary equivalent of) imprisonment (I), both of which depend on the crime committed 
by the criminal and on the severity of the punishment (x,y).s Thus, the punishment function is 
given by p=p(c,x,y)=F(c,x)+I(c,y), such that Fc>0, Fx>O, le >0, and Iy> 0; or, alternatively, 
Pc> 0, Px> 0, and Py > 0. 6 This implies that both fines and imprisonment are increasing in the 
harm caused by the criminal and in the severity of the punishment. Further, assume that Fcx>O 
and Icy> 0 (hence, Pcx > 0 and Pcy> 0); that is, the marginal punishment is increasing in the 
severity of the punishment. Finally, let P=p(c,x,y)-W be the net punishment imposed on the 
criminal, and let the criminal's utility when he does not get away with his crime be a function 
of the vector Y considered before. Thus, the criminal's utility function when he is punished (U') 
5 The severity of a fine (x) is a parameter that determines, for each level of harm, the 
amount of money the criminal must pay. The severity of imprisonment (y), on the other hand, 
is a parameter that determines, for each level of harm, the length of the prison sentence the 
criminal must serve. 
6 Note that since the amount of crime the criminal produces depends on the amount of time 
he allocates to criminal activities, the punishment function he considers is F[c(t) ,x] + I[c(t),y]. 
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is given by UP=U{P,Y}=U{F[c(t),x]+I[c(t),y]-W,Y}, such that Up<O and Upp<O; that is, 
punishment generates disutility at an increasing rate. Note, however, that uP is not necessarily 
negative; even if the criminal is punished, the utility he derives from Y may outweigh the 
disutility of the punishment. This, in fact, seems to be the most realistic case. As before, the 
sign of Uy depends on which argument of Y is considered. 
Consider now all the elements at once. The criminal enjoys the consumption of a single 
good (g). In order to produce this good, the criminal needs to commit a crime (c), for which he 
needs to allocate some time (t) to criminal activities and some leisure time (I) to the enjoyment 
of this commodity. The production of crime has a negative impact on the rest of society, and 
therefore criminal activities are punished. However, the punishment (P) will be suffered by the 
criminal only if he is apprehended, which occurs with probability a. This probability, together 
with the severity of the punishment (x,y), are taken as given by the criminal. Finally, the 
criminal's utility in both states of the world depends on his wealth (W), and on some exogenous 
variables (Y). In this framework, the (representative) criminal acts as a Stackelberg follower 
whose problem is to allocate his time (T) between the production of the good (leisure time) and 
the production of crime (labor time) in order to maximize his expected utility (EU). Formally: 
maxl,t EU = aU{F[c(t),x]+ I[c(t),y]-W, Y}+(I-a)U{g[c(t),I],W,Y} (la) 
subject to: I+t=T (lb) 
EU~u (lc) 
where 0 is the criminal's subsistence level of utility, which is exogenously determined.' 
Replacing the time constraint (I =T-t) into the utility function, maximizing with respect to t, and 
rearranging yields: 
(l-a)(U.gcct-U.g,) = - aUp(Fc+lc)ct (2) 
The left-hand side of (2) is the expected net marginal benefit of allocating time to 
criminal activities, and shows that, when the criminal increases his labor time, he increases his 
production of crime, which increases the production of the good, which, in turn, increases his 
utility. Yet, when the criminal allocates more time to criminal activities, he forgoes leisure time, 
7 The criminal's problem will be solved assuming that (lc) does not bind. Cases in which 
this constraint does bind are analyzed below. 
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which reduces the production of the good, which, in turn, reduces his utility. The right-hand side 
of (2) is the expected marginal cost of allocating more time to criminal activities, and shows 
that, when the criminal increases his labor time, he increases his production of crime, which 
increases his expected punishment, which, in turn, decreases his utility. 
The optimal allocation of time to criminal activities (n solves from (2) and is a function 
of the parameters of the criminal's model; that is, t· =ncr,x,y,T,W,V). In order to focus on the 
criminal's reaction in response to changes in the probability of apprehension and in the severity 
of the punishment, this last expression can be simplified to t·=t(cr,x,y). This relationship may 
be thought of as the criminal's labor supply function, which indicates the criminal's optimal 
supply of labor for each value of the probability of apprehension and each level of severity. 
Once the criminal has chosen the optimal amount of time to be allocated to criminal activities, 
his other choices follow straightforwardly. Of particular importance for further analysis is the 
criminal's optimal production of crime, which is given by: 
c· = c[ncr,x,y)] = c(cr,x,y) (3) 
This relationship shows the optimal amount of crime produced by the criminal for each level of 
the probability of apprehension and each level of severity. Thus, let (3) be the criminal's 
reaction function. 
A caveat is in order. The analysis above is valid as long as (lc) does not bind; that is, 
as long as EU· (the maximum value of the criminal's expected utility) is larger or equal than u 
(the criminal's subsistence level of utility). When, on the other hand, EU· < 0, the criminal, after 
having allocated his time in the most efficient way, cannot attain his subsistence level of utility. 
This may happen because there exists either a very severe punishment, or a very high probability 
of apprehension, or a combination of both. Under these circumstances, the criminal may 
overcome his moral constraints, give up criminal activities, and become a decent member of 
society. This line of reasoning suggests that a criminal may be induced to quit criminal activities 
through the imposition of severe punishments or high probabilities of apprehension (or both). 
This issue is considered in more detail in the next section. 
2- The deterrence effect 
I address in this section the issue of deterrence; that is, the issue of whether a criminal 
can somehow be induced to give up his criminal activities. Several models on the topic have 
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been developed in the literature; theoretical and empirical evidence has been found to support 
both the deterrence and the non-deterrence hypotheses. 8 I derive below formal results that 
support the existence of a deterrence effect. 
Consider the impact of an increase in the probability of apprehension first. Whether or 
not a criminal can be deterred depends on the sign of the expression ac-Iaa=(ac-Ian(at-Iaa). 
Recall that (ac-Ian is positive. Thus, the sign of ac-Iaa, and, therefore, the existence of a 
deterrence effect depends on the sign of (at-Iaa). The sign of this last expression can be found 
by differentiating (2) with respect to t and a. Thus: 
at-Iaa = [U,gcc.-U,g.-Up(Fc+Ic)eJ/H < 0 (4) 
where H is the second-order condition for utility maximization, which is assumed to hold. 
Equation (4) shows an unambiguous result: a rational criminal can be deterred.9 That is, if 
society decides to increase the probability of apprehension, a rational criminal will respond by 
reducing the time he allocates to criminal activities, and, therefore, his production of crime. 
Consider now the impact of an increase in the severity of fines. Whether or not a 
criminal can be deterred depends on the sign of the expression ac-Iax=(ac-Ian(at-Iax). Since, 
as before, (ac-Iat-) is positive, the sign of ac-Iax, and, therefore, the existence of a deterrence 
effect depends on the sign of (at-lax). The sign of this last expression can be found by 
differentiating (2) with respect to t and x. Thus: 
a(lax = {-acl[UppFx(Fc+Ic)+UpFcx]}/H < 0 (5) 
As in the previous case, (5) shows that a rational criminal can be deterred. That is, an increase 
in the severity of fines unambiguously induces a rational criminal to reduce the time he allocates 
to criminal activities, and, therefore, his production of crime. 
8 For an extensive list of models and results on this topic, see Schmidt and Witte (1984), 
chapter 9, table 9.7. 
9 This can be seen as follows. The second-order condition is assumed to hold; hence, H <O. 
Further, since the right-hand side of (2) is positive, so has to be the left-hand side, and, given 
that (I-a) is positive, so has to be the second parenthesis. The numerator of (4) is equal to the 
second parenthesis in the right-hand side of (2) minus a negative term; hence, this numerator is 
unambiguously positive. From a positive numerator and a negative denominator, the sign of (4) 
follows. 
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Finally, consider the impact of an increase in the severity of prison sentences. Whether 
or not a criminal can be deterred depends on the sign of the expression oc-Ioy=(oc-Iotj(ot-Ioy). 
Since, as before, (oc-Iotj is positive, the sign of oc-Ioy depends on the sign of (ot-Ioy). The sign 
of this last expression can be found by differentiating (2) with respect to t and y. Thus: 
ot-Ioy = {-act[UppIy(Fc+Ic)+Uplcy]}/H < 0 (6) 
As in the previous two cases, (6) shows that a rational criminal can be deterred. That is, an 
increase in the severity of prison sentences unambiguously induces a rational criminal to reduce 
his production of crime. The results that follow from equations (4), (5) and (6) are summarized 
in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1: A rational criminal can be induced to reduce his criminal activities through 
an increase in the probability of apprehension or in the severity of the punishment. That is, 
c:<O, c;<O, and c;<O. 
Note that proposition 1 establishes that rational criminals can be deterred through an 
increase in the probability of apprehension or in the severity of the punishment, but it says 
nothing about how these three parameters (OI,x,y) are set. In fact, they are parameters only from 
the criminal's point of view; from the rest of society's point of view, the probability of 
apprehension and the severity of the punishment are variables that have to be optimally 
determined. I turn now to discuss the framework within which victims consider this problem. 
3- The victim's behavior 
The (representative) victim's utility depends upon three arguments: the consumption of 
a good (q), a crime externality (E), and some other exogenous variables (Z) not explicitly 
considered in the model. The victim's problem is to allocate his endowment of a resource (R) 
between the production of the good and the production of security in order to deter crime. In 
other words, the victim faces a trade-off between consumption and security. 
The good is produced with a single input (r), which is a portion of the resource R. Thus, 
the production function of the good is given by q=q(r), such that q.. >O. In general, the resource 
will not be allocated entirely to the production of q; a portion of R (s) will be allocated to the 
production of security, in order to increase the probability of catching criminals. Hence, 
a=a(s), such that as>O, may be thought of as the production function of security. Since R can 
be allocated only to the production of the good or to the production of security, and its supply 
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is fixed, then, r+s=R. 
Crime has an obvious negative effect on the victim's utility. This negative effect, which 
will be referred to as a crime externality (E), has three components: the harm caused by the 
criminal, the expected cost of imprisonment, and the expected compensation the victim receives 
from the criminal when the latter is fined. Note that when the criminal is punished with a fine, 
the victim receives a monetary compensation for the harm he suffered. Yet, this compensation 
is not certain; it is received by the victim only if the criminal is apprehended, which occurs with 
probability a. (Hence, the victim's expected compensation is aF.) If the criminal is imprisoned, 
on the other hand, the victim bears the cost of imprisonment (K), which is increasing in the 
length of the prison sentence; that is, K = K(I), such that K) > 0. 10 Therefore, the crime 
externality produced by the criminal and suffered by the victim is given by E=c+aK-exF. 
Consider now all the elements at once. The victim is endowed with a fixed amount of 
a resource (R). A portion of this resource (r) is allocated to produce a commodity whose 
consumption the victim enjoys (q), and the rest (s) is allocated to the production of security, to 
increase the probability of apprehension (ex) in order to deter crime. Criminal activities generate 
a negative impact (E) on the victim's utility. This negative impact increases with the harm 
caused by criminals (c) and with the expected cost of imprisonment (aK), and decreases with 
the expected compensation the victim receives from the criminal (aF). Finally, the victim's 
utility depends on some other variables (Z) not explicitly considered in the model. Thus, the 
victim's utility function is given by V=V(q,E,Z), such that Vq>O, Vqq<O, VE<O, and VEE>O. 
The sign of Vz, on the other hand, depends on which argument of the vector Z is considered; 
some arguments generate utility and some others disutility. 
Recall that the victim's choice variables are the probability of apprehension and the 
severity of the punishment. Note that, when choosing these variables, the victim must take into 
account the criminal's reaction to his choice. This is due to the fact that the amount of crime the 
)0 The cost of imprisonment should be thought of as having two components: a fixed cost 
(k) and a variable cost; hence, K=k+ K(I). Yet, since fixed costs do not affect marginal 
decisions, for simplicity, only variable costs are considered in the model. Hence, these costs are 
incurred by the victim with probability a. Note, on the other hand, that fines are assumed to be 
costless. 
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criminal will produce depends on the probability of apprehension and the severity of the 
punishment chosen by the victim, which depend on the amount of crime the criminal produces, 
which depend on the probability of apprehension and the severity of the punishment chosen by 
the victim, and so on. Hence, the victim can be modelled as a Stackelberg leader who maximizes 
his utility by considering the criminal's optimal response to each choice of the probability of 
apprehension and the severity of the punishment; that is, by taking into account the criminal's 
reaction function. Thus, the crime externality considered by the victim is of the form 
E=c[a(s),x,y]+a(s)K[I[c(a(s),x,y),y]]-a(s)F[c(a(s),x,y),x]. 
Finally, to complete the analysis of the victim's behavior, it is assumed that society's 
attitude toward crime is proper deterrence; that is, the punishment imposed on the criminal 
neither overcompensates nor undercompensates the victim. 1I It thus follows that the restriction 
of proper deterrence amounts to imposing a punishment such that aF=c+aK; that is, such that 
E=O. Thus, the victim's problem is to allocate his resource between consumption and security, 
and to choose the severity of the punishment, in order to maximize his utility, subject to the goal 
of proper deterrence. Formally: 
maxr,s,x,y V = V{q(r), c[a(s),x,y]+a(s)K[l[c(a(s),x,y),y]]-a(s)F[c(a(s),x,y),x], Z} (7a) 
subject to: r+s=R (7b) 
E=O a~ 
V~v (7d) 
where v is the victim's subsistence level of utility, which is exogenously determined.The first-
order conditions for this problem, together with the issue of optimal punishment are analyzed 
below. 12 
11 A victim is overcompensated when aF>c+aK (hence, E<O), and undercompensated 
when aF<c+aK (hence, E>O). 
12 The victim's problem will be solved assuming that (7d) does not bind. Cases in which this 
constraint does bind will be analyzed later. To simplify the analysis further, (7b) will be 
eliminated by replacing r by (R-s) into the utility function. Thus, in what follows, the 
representative victim will be assumed to maximize such a modified utility function subject to the 
constraint of proper deterrence. 
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ID- OPTIMAL PUNISHMENT 
Having set up the model within which the criminal and the victim make their decisions, 
I turn now to analyze the issue of optimal punishment. I consider first a simplified model in 
order to highlight an important aspect of punishing with fines. 
1.- Punishment with fines 
When the only form of punishing a criminal is through the imposition of a fine, the 
analytical framework becomes significantly simpler. In particular, the victim's problem becomes: 
max.,x V = V{q(R-s), c[a(s),x]-a(s)P[c(a(s),x),x], Z} (8a) 
subject to: E=O (8b) 
V~V ~~ 
Thus, the optimal fine (F0) solves directly from the restriction of proper deterrence; that is: 
po = (1/a)c (9) 
This result makes intuitive sense. Under the constraint of proper deterrence, the criminal 
should be punished with a fine equal to (the monetary equivalent of) the harm he inflicts on 
society. Yet, since the criminal is not punished with certainty, in order to make the expected 
punishment equal to the harm caused by the criminal, the harm has to be corrected by the 
inverse of the probability of apprehension. Hence, the optimal fine is larger than the harm 
caused by the criminal. 
However, that is not the end of the story. Note that, for any given level of harm, it is 
always convenient for the victim to increase the fine and to decrease the probability of 
apprehension so as to achieve the same expected punishment at a lower cost. 13 This leads to 
the somewhat startling result that, given the level of harm, the victim will choose a probability 
of apprehension as small as possible (a-.{», and a fine as high as possible (P_oo):4 However, 
the criminal's wealth (W) puts a constraint on the victim's ability to set the fine; for the most 
the victim can take from the criminal is W. Therefore, an important result is established in the 
following proposition: 
13 This is due to the fact that increasing the fine is costless, but decreasing the probability 
of apprehension enables the victim to reallocate resources to the production of the good. 
14 This result was originally suggested by Becker (1968), p. 183. 
13 
PROPOSITION 2: The optimal fine is equal to the criminal's wealth. That is, P=W. 
Note that in the model under consideration all criminals are identical. If this were not the 
case, a controversial implication of proposition 2 is given by the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3: Two criminals with different wealth should be punished differently for the 
same crime. That is, if cj=cj , and ~pt"'}, then F;(= WJ pt 11(=W), for all iptj. 
Note that if the criminal is punished with a fine equal to his wealth regardless of the 
harm he causes, the crime externality becomes E=c-cvW, which may be positive, negative, or 
zero, depending on the level harm (c). Put differently, the goal of proper deterrence defeats 
itself and degenerates into an uniform punishment. Thus, when the criminal is punished with a 
fine equal to his wealth, the victim's problem becomes: 
maxs.x V = V{q(R-s), c[cv(s),x]-cv(s)W, Z} (lOa) 
subject to: V ~ v (lOb) 
and the first-order conditions for this problem are given by: 
VECaCVs-VECVsW = Vqqr (11) 
VEcx = 0 (12) 
Equation (11) shows the basic trade-off faced by the victim. An increase in the amount 
of the resource allocated to security increases the victim's utility in two ways. First, it increases 
the probability of apprehension, which reduces the amount of crime, which decreases the crime 
externality, which, in turn, increases the victim's utility. Such is the benefit of deterrence. 
Second, the increase in the probability of apprehension increases the expected compensation 
received by the victim, which decreases the crime externality, which, in turn, increases the 
victim's utility. These two benefits are obtained by society at a cost, namely, the consumption 
the victim forgoes when he reallocates the resource from consumption to security. 
Equation (12), on the other hand, reaffirms proposition 2. This equation shows that the 
only effect of increasing the severity of fines is that of deterring the criminal (which decreases 
the crime externality, which, in turn, increases the victim's utility), and, therefore, such a 
punishment should be as severe as possible. IS In other words, the optimal fine should be as 
high as possible; that is, equal to the criminal's wealth. 
15 Let l be the maximum level of severity; that is, the x such that F(C,l)=W. 
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Let an equilibrium be defined as a set {c,a,x}, such that the utility of both the criminal 
and the victim are maximized. Further, let s· and x·=x be the optimal expenditure on security 
and the severity of the fine, respectively, that solve from the system (11)-(12). Finally, let 
a·=a(s·) be the optimal probability of apprehension, and c·=c(a·,X) the optimal amount of 
crime that solves (indirectly) from (2). Therefore, an equilibrium in the model is given by the 
set {c·,a"X}; that is, by the amount of crime, the probability of apprehension and the severity 
of the fine that maximize the utility of criminals and victims. 
2.- Punishment with fines and imprisonment 
I relax in this section the assumption that criminals can only be punished with fines. The 
previous simplification was useful to illustrate the fact that, when fines are used, they should be 
equal to the criminal's wealth. This result, for the same reasons discussed above, also applies 
to a more complicated model in which prison sentences are included as a complementary form 
of punishment. However, note that once the criminal has decided which crimes are profitable 
to him (given the probability of apprehension and a fine equal to his wealth), a perverse result 
arises: at the margin, the criminal is given no incentive to reduce the amount of crime he 
produces; that is, he will commit the most harmful crimes. This is due to the fact that, if the 
expected punishment is fixed, then the criminal will increase his production of crime as long as 
causing additional harm increases his utility. 16 In other words, once the criminal has decided 
which crimes are profitable to him, he cannot be induced to commit the least harmful of these 
crimes through an increase in fines. 17 
When prison sentences are introduced into the model, the victim's problem becomes: 
maxs.x,y V = V{q(R-S), c[a(s),x,y] +a(s)K[I[c(cx(s),x,y),y]]-cx(s)W,Z} (13a) 
subject to: V ~ v (13b) 
and the first-order conditions for this problem are: 
16 Note that when the criminal is punished with a fine equal to his wealth, the right-hand side 
of (2) becomes O. Thus, the only trade off the criminal faces is between labor and leisure. 
17 This result does not contradict the deterrence effect of fines established by (5). Instead, 
it establishes what happens when a corner solution is obtained. The deterrence effect still holds 
for fines lower than the criminal's wealth. 
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VBcaa.-VBa.W+VBaKIIccaa. = Vqqr-VEa.K (14) 
VBcx+VBaKIIccx = 0 (15) 
VEcy+VBaKllccy = -VEaK1Iy (16) 
Equation (14) shows that prison sentences add an extra benefit and an extra cost to the 
victim's trade off between consumption and security, compared to the case in which fines are 
the only form of punishment. The additional benefit is the decrease in the expected cost of prison 
sentences, which arises in the decrease in crime, which arises in the increase in the probability 
of apprehension, which, in turn, arises in the increase in the amount of the resource allocated 
to security. The additional cost, on the other hand, stems from the fact that an increase in the 
probability of apprehension makes victims more likely to incur in the (variable) cost of 
imprisonment. 
Equation (15) shows that fines should still be set as high as possible; that is, equal to the 
criminal's wealth. The only difference with respect to the case where fines are the only way to 
punish criminals is that, in the present case, an increase in the severity of fines generates an 
extra benefit, namely, a decrease in the expected cost of imprisonment. Finally, equation (16) 
shows that an increase in the severity of prison sentences generates two benefits to the victim, 
namely, a reduction in the amount of crime, and a reduction in the expected cost of 
imprisonment. These are the direct and the indirect benefits of deterrence, respectively. On the 
other hand, an increase in the severity of prison sentences leads to longer (expected) prison 
terms, thus increasing the expected cost of imprisonment. 
When establishing an optimal punishment structure, it should be noticed that fines are 
costless but prison sentences are costly. Thus, a criminal should not be imprisoned if he can 
monetarily compensate society for the harm he caused. Therefore: 
PROPOSITION 4: As long as fines can be imposed, prison sentences should be avoided. That 
is, ifaW~c, then ~=W. 
Note, however, that prison sentences can be varied with the extent of the harm caused 
by the criminal, whereas the optimal fine is fixed. Since, as discussed before, a fixed punishment 
does not give the criminal any marginal incentive to reduce the harm he causes, then prison 
sentences are needed in some cases to restore the lost optimality. This follows from the fact that 
prison sentences force the criminal to face a marginal cost that increases with the harm he causes 
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to society. Thus, an optimal punishment structure (p.) is established in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 5: If the harm caused by the criminal cannot be compensated by the highest 
feasible fine, a prison sentence that increases with the level of harm caused by the criminal 
should complement afine equal to the criminal's wealth. That is, if aW<c, then p·=w+f, 
where f=l(c,l). 
Finally, an equilibrium in the model is defined as a set {c,a,x,y} that maximizes the 
utility of both the criminal and the victim. Let s·, x·=x, and y. be the optimal values of the 
expenditure in security, the severity of the fine, and the severity of prison sentences, 
respectively, that solve from the system (14)-(16). Further, let a·=a(s·) be the optimal 
probability of apprehension, and c·=c(a·,x,y·) the optimal amount of crime that solves 
(indirectly) from (2). Therefore, an equilibrium in the model is given by a set {c·,a·,x,y·}; that 
is, by the amount of crime, the probability of apprehension, and the severity of the punishment 
that maximize the utility of criminals and victims. 
A final caveat is in order. The analysis above is valid as long as (13b) does not bind; that 
is, as long as V· (the maximum value of the victim's utility function) is larger or equal than v 
(the victim's subsistence level of utility). When, on the other hand, V· < v, a decent member of 
society, after having allocated his resources in the most efficient way, and, after having selected 
the optimal severity of the punishment, cannot attain his subsistence level of utility. Under these 
circumstances, he may overcome his moral constraints and become a criminal. This result 
explains, for example, robberies for necessity. 
IV· CONCLUSIONS 
I have introduced a model that recreates the noncooperative way in which criminals and 
the rest of society interact in the real world. I have argued that criminals can be modelled as 
rational agents that face a labor-supply problem. Thus, given the probability of apprehension and 
the severity of the punishment, they choose the optimal amount of crime to be committed. I have 
established that criminals that behave in such a way can be deterred by increases in the 
probability of apprehension and in the severity of the punishment. 
I have further argued that the decent members of society face a trade off between 
consumption and security that stems from the limited amount of resources to be allocated 
between the production ofcommodities and crime deterrence. I have established that these decent 
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members of society should set fines equal to the criminals' wealth, thus implying that criminals 
with different wealth should be punished differently for the same crime. Further, after having 
established that as long as fines can be imposed prison sentences should be avoided, I argued 
that when criminals cannot monetarily compensate society for the harm they caused, an optimal 
punishment structure calls for the imposition of a prison term in addition to the optimal fine. 
In sum, I have introduced a simple noncooperative analytical framework within which 
issues of crime and punishment can (and should) be analyzed, and from which important policy 
recommendations can be derived. If modelling economic behavior is about getting closer to 
recreate the way agents act in the real world, perhaps this paper can be considered a step in the 
right direction. 
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